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ABSTRACT
In recent years, wireless Internet service providers (WISPs)
have established thousands of WiFi hot spots in cafes, ho-
tels and airports in order to offer to travelling Internet users
access to email, web or other Internet service. However,
two major problems still slow down the deployment of this
kind of networks: the lack of a seamless roaming scheme
and the variable quality of service experienced by the users.
This paper provides a response to these two problems: We
present a solution that, on the one hand, allows a mobile
node to connect to a foreign WISP in a secure way while
preserving its anonymity and, on the other hand, encour-
ages the WISPs to provide the users with good QoS. We
analyse the robustness of our solution against various at-
tacks and we prove by means of simulations that our repu-
tation model indeed encourages the WISPs to behave cor-
rectly.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.1: Wireless
communication, Network communications.
General Terms: Design, Security, Theory.
Keywords: WiFi networks, Reputation systems, Roam-
ing, billing, Security, QoS, Protocols.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless data services based on cellular networks, such as
GSM/GPRS, provide users with very good coverage. How-
ever, they have several intrinsic and well-known drawbacks:
the offered bitrates are relatively low (and this is unlikely
to change with the Third Generation), and the deployment
of new features is hampered by several factors such as the
large size and oligopolistic behavior of the operators, their
willingness to provide homogeneous service, and the huge
†Work done while at RSA Laboratories.∗The work presented in this paper was supported (in part)
by the National Competence Center in Research on Mobile
Information and Communication Systems (NCCR-MICS),
a center supported by the Swiss National Science Founda-
tion under grant number 5005− 67322
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
WMASH’04, October 1, 2004, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
Copyright 2004 ACM 1-58113-877-6/04/0010 ...$5.00.
upfront investment; in addition, very often, a user located
in his home country is not allowed to obtain service from
the competitors of his home network.
The deployment of wireless networks such as WiFi in
unlicensed frequencies makes it possible to envision a sub-
stantial paradigm shift, with very significant benefits: much
higher bandwidth network, deployment based possibly on
local initiative, higher competition, and much shorter time-
to-market for new features. This may, in turn, pave the
way for new types of services, whether these require higher
bandwidth, lower per-bit costs, reduced energy consump-
tion for the mobile nodes or higher reliance on fast-changing
and locally provided content.
The current, rapid deployment of hot spots reveals the
strong potential of this approach. However, two major
problems still need to be solved. The first problem is the
provision of a seamless roaming1 scheme that would en-
courage small operators to enter into the market. This is a
fundamental issue for the future of mobile communications.
Indeed, without an appropriate scheme, only large stake-
holders would be able to operate their network in a prof-
itable way, and would impose a market organization very
similar to the one observed today for cellular networks; one
of the greatest opportunities to fuel innovation in wireless
communications would be missed. The second problem is
the guarantee of a good quality of service provision to the
users.
This paper provides a response to these two challenges.
By appropriately unbundling the major functions of the
network, it institutes a virtuous cycle of deployment and
usage: Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP) will be
encouraged to deploy their network and will be confident
that mobile users registered with other WISPs will pay for
the service they receive; likewise, users will be assured that
the WISPs are under the scrutiny of all the other users (in-
cluding the roaming ones), and that they will be informed
about their degree of satisfaction.
As we will see, the solution is relatively simple, provided
that the roles of the different entities are clearly defined.
We describe these entities in detail, along with the security
protocols and the charging mechanism. In order to facili-
tate user acceptance, the proposed solution minimizes user
involvement: once the mobile device has been initialized,
it can make all decisions autonomously.
1Note that by roaming we designate the operation of ob-
taining service from different operators, and not the handoff
between access points (managed by the same provider or
by two different providers). The handoff problem is out of
the scope of this paper.
One of the major goals of this work is to build up trust
between mobile users and WISPs. For this reason, we pro-
vide a detailed threat analysis and we show that the pro-
posed protocols can thwart rational attacks and detect ma-
licious attacks (we define these terms in Subsection 2.2).
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way:
In Section 2 we present the system and trust models and we
give an overview of the proposed solution. In Section 3, we
describe the details of the protocols. We study the security
of the protocols and analyse some interesting aspects of
the solution in Section 4. In Section 5, the simulations
are described and the results are analyzed. Finally, we
present the state of the art in Section 6 and we conclude in
Section 7.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider a mobile node MN that wants
to connect to the Internet via a neighboring hot spot (i.e., a
hot spot that is within its power range); we assume the hot
spot to be managed by a Wireless Internet Service Provider
(WISP) that we denote by S (see Figure 1). MN is affili-
ated with its home WISP H2 with whom it has an account
and shares a symmetric key kHM . We assume that all the
messages exchanged between MN and H go through S.
Note that it is possible to have S = H.
Figure 1: The system model.
All WISPs in our model are registered with the trusted
central authority TCA that creates for each of them a pub-
lic/private key pair and a certificate of their public key and
of their identity. In a “grassroots” vision, the TCA would
be a federation of WISPs, who join forces to centralize a
few strategic functions. In a more conventional vision, the
TCA can be under the control of a world-wide organization
such as a quality control company, a certification company,
or a global telecommunications operator. TCA can be dis-
tributed, as certification companies are, to avoid being a
bottleneck.
In this paper, we present a reputation based mechanism
that, on the one hand, allows MN to evaluate the behav-
ior of the WISPs and, on the other hand, encourages the
WISPs to provide the users with good QoS. Each WISP in
our model has what we call a reputation record that rep-
resents an evaluation of its behavior and that is generated
and signed by TCA. The choice of the initial reputation
record of a WISP is discussed in Section 5.
In order to make sure that the mobile nodes pay for the
service they receive, we also propose a credit-based micro-
payment scheme (see Subsection 3.1.1) that is highly in-
spired from the PayWord scheme [20]. Our solution takes
into account the fact that MN is a ressource restrained
mobile device and therefore has much less computing and
storage resources than TCA, H or S.
2The solution works even if H does not operate hotspots
itself.
2.1 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions in this paper:
• The public key of TCA is known by all other entities.
• H and S can use their public keys to establish a tem-
porary symmetric key kHS . We assume that this key
is generated prior to the execution of our set of pro-
tocols.
• S is able to predict the QoS it can offer MN. We will
discuss this issue more in detail in Subsection 5.3.
• The backbone is a commodity; the rewarding of the
backbone operator should follow already established
practices and techniques, and will not be addressed
in this paper (we assume that S, H and TCA have
an appropriate agreement to have connectivity - e.g.,
a flat rate subscription).
• In this paper, we do not consider the handoff prob-
lem: A mobile node that moves out of the range of
a hot spot stops using that hot spot as access point
and initiates a new connection with one of the new
neighboring hot spots.
2.2 Trust and adversarial model
We consider an attacker A that wants to perform an
attack against our protocols (see Subsection 4.1 for the list
of attacks). A can be a mobile node or a WISP. We assume
that:
• TCA never cheats and is trusted by the other parties
for all the actions it performs.
• The WISPs (here S and H) are rational and therefore
they cheat (i.e., perform one of the attacks presented
in Subsection 4.1) only if it is to their advantage (i.e.,
they gain something - in terms of money - from cheat-
ing). This assumption is reasonable because a WISP
is likely to be motivated by economic incentives, and
would not be inclined to disrupt the communication
of mobile nodes (who could simply choose another
WISP if this were to occur).
• MN may be malicious and therefore it can cheat (i.e.,
perform one of the attacks presented in Subsection 4.1)
even if there is no gain from cheating (this implicitly
assumes that MN can also perform rational attacks).
• MN trusts H for managing its account.
• Several attackers can collude and share information
(possibly their secret keys) to perform more sophisti-
cated attacks.
Confidentiality of data is not an issue in our case, so we
do not consider passive attacks where the attacker eaves-
drops the data exchanges between two parties. Note that
this is an orthogonal issue that is easily addressed using
standard security techniques.
We consider exclusively attacks performed against the
different phases of our protocols, meaning that we do not
consider other arbitrary attacks like DoS attacks based on
jamming for example.
In this paper, we want to study the effect of rational
and malicious attacks on our set of protocols. Our goal
is to make sure that our solution thwarts rational attacks,
detects malicious attacks and, if possible, identifies the at-
tacker.
2.3 Rationale of the solution
When MN wants to connect to the Internet, it identifies
the neighboring WISPs3 and contacts them (see Figure 2).
Each WISP sends to MN an offer that contains its reputa-
tion record, the QoS it proposes and the price it asks for.
Then, MN selects the WISP S that proposes the best offer
and verifies its identity. S also verifies, with the help of H,
that MN is a valid node. MN and S establish a contract,
inform TCA and H about it and establish a secure session
by setting up a symmetric key kMS .
This secure session is divided into parts. During the i-th
part, MN sends a payment proof for the i-th part of the
service and S provides that part of the service. The pay-
ment proofs and the services are secured using the shared
key kMS .
At the end of the connection, MN assesses the QoS it
received, compares it to the QoS advertised by S during the
session setup and informs TCA about its satisfaction level.
S also sends the payment proof(s) to H which charges MN
(by manipulating its account) and remunerates S according
to the received information.
Figure 2: The proposed solution
TCA collects the feedback about the different WISPs,
updates periodically the reputation records according to
the collected information and provides the WISPs with
their new reputation records.
3Note that we refer to the access points using the identities
of the WISPs that are managing them.
3. PROPOSED SOLUTION
3.1 Basic mechanisms
3.1.1 Micro-payment scheme
As already mentioned in Section 2, the payment scheme
we use in this paper is highly inspired from the PayWord
scheme [20]: During the session setup, MN generates a
long fresh chain of paywords w0, w1 , ..., wn by choosing
wn at random and by computing wi = h(wi+1) for i =
n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 0, where h is a one-way hash function and
n is the maximum number of payments that MN can send
to S during the session. Then, MN reveals the root w0 of
the payword chain (which is not considered as a payword
itself) to S, H and TCA.
During the session, MN sends (wi , i) to S as a payment
proof for the i-th part of the service. S can easily ver-
ify wi using wi−1 that is known from the previous micro-
payment or from w0 if i = 1. At the end of the service
provision, S contacts H and presents the last payment (w`
, `) it received. H verifies the validity of w`, pays S the
amount corresponding to ` paywords and charges MN for
that amount by manipulating its billing account.
We use this micropayment scheme because it allows an
oﬄine verification of the payment proofs and because of its
low computational and storage cost for the mobile nodes.
3.1.2 Authentication of MN by H
As stated in Section 2, all communication between MN
and H goes through S. Therefore, in order to preserve the
anonymity ofMN regarding S, we use the following authen-
tication mechanism, that is commonly used in the industry
(e.g., SecurID [11]): When MN gets affiliated with H, the
two parties share a random seed s that represents the in-
put to a pseudorandom generator. The output is a random
number tag that is 30 to 50 bits long. H keeps a small
window (e.g., 50 entries) of upcoming tags for each mobile
node and maintains the pairs (tag; node’s identity) in a
sorted database. Upon receipt of a given tag, H searches
its database, retrieves the pair (tag;identity) and identifies
MN. In case of collision (i.e., more than one pair contains
the random number tag), H asks MN to send the next tag
value.
3.2 Details of the protocols
3.2.1 Selection of the WISP
When it wants to obtain Internet access, MN scans the
spectrum, identifies the neighboring WISPs and asks them
an offer by broadcasting the following request message:
OfferReq = [ReqID ,nM ] (1)
where ReqID is the request identifier and nM is a nonce gen-
erated by MN. Each WISPW willing (and able) to provide
service at that time responds by a signed offer OfferW :
W → MN : OfferW ,SpkW (OfferW ,nM ) where
OfferW = [W ,RRW ,AQW ,PW ,Cert(W )] (2)
where RRW is the most recent reputation record of W
(signed by TCA), AQW is the QoS it advertises
4, PW is
4W may advertise a QoS that is higher than the real QoS
(RQW ) it is able to offer to MN. The consequences of such
a behavior are studied in Section 5.
the price it is requesting for each part of the service (see
Subsection 3.2.4), pkW is its private key and Cert(W ) is
the certificate of its public key PKW .
Upon receipt of the offers, MN verifies the freshness of
nW and identifies the best offer. This choice depends on
the relative importance that MN gives to the parameters
RW , QW and PW (as shown in Section 5, these parameters
can depend on the application MN intends to run) and
should be made by a software agent to automate the process
and avoid human involvement. More sophisticated schemes
(e.g., auctioning) can also be envisioned.
Then, MN verifies the certificate and the signature of
the WISP that proposed the best offer. If the verification
is incorrect, MN checks the second best offer and so on.
We denote the selected WISP by S.
3.2.2 Verifying that MN has a valid account
Before starting the session, S has to make sure that MN
is a valid mobile node that is registered with a valid home
WISP. As we want to preserve the anonymity of MN, the
verification of MN ’s identity involves H and uses the au-
thentication mechanism described in Subsection 3.1.2. We
have thus the following messages exchanged:
MN → S : M = [H , tag ,nM
EkHM (MN ,S , tag ,nM )] (3)
S → H : S ,nS ,M,MACkHS (S ,M) (4)
H → S : TID ,EkHM (TID ,nM , kMS ),
EkHS (TID ,nS , kMS ) (5)
S → MN : TID ,EkHM (TID ,nM , kMS ) (6)
(3)MN sends to S a messageM containing, in clear, the
identity of H, its current tag and a freshly generated nonce
nM . M also contains, encrypted using the symmetric key
kHM , the identities ofMN and S, the tag tag and the nonce
nM .
(4) S sends to H its identity, a freshly generated nonce
nS , the message M and a MAC computed on both items
using the key kHS .
(5) H searches its sorted database, identifies MN using
the tag sent in clear (as explained in Subsection 3.1.2),
looks up the symmetric key it shares with MN and uses
it to decrypt the rest of the message. Then, H re-checks
the identity of MN (the identity corresponding to the tag
should also correspond to the identity MN encrypted in
the message) and verifies that the WISP with which MN
intends to interact is indeed the WISP that sent the mes-
sage.
If the message is not correct, H informs S thatMN is not
affiliated with it by sending a negative acknowledgement.
If, on the contrary, the message verifies correctly, H gener-
ates a symmetric key kMS that MN and S will use later as
a session key (i.e., all the messages exchanged between MN
and S during the session are secured using kMS ). Then, H
constructs a message containing:
• in clear, a fresh temporary identifier TID for MN
(TID will be used during service provision),
• TID , nM , and kMS encrypted using the symmetric
key kHM , and
• TID , nS , and kMS encrypted using the symmetric key
kHS ,
and sends this message to S. H maintains a table contain-
ing the correspondence between the temporary identifiers
and the identities of the nodes; given TID , H can positively
identify the correspondent MN.
(6) S decrypts EkHS (TID ,nM , kMS ), verifies that the tem-
porary identifier in the decrypted part corresponds to the
one sent in clear and compares the nonce in the decrypted
part with the one generated by MN. If these verifications
are correct, S removes EkHS (TID ,nM , kMS ) from the mes-
sage and forwards the rest to MN.
MN decrypts EkHM (TID ,nH , kMS ) and verifies the tem-
porary identifier and the nonce as S did. If everything is
correct, MN maintains TID in memory.
Note that if S = H, MN sends message (3) to H and H
responds with message (6).
3.2.3 Contract establishment and communication
During this phase, MN generates a long hash chain of
n+1 elements, computed from a randomly chosen seed wn
as described in Subsection 3.1.1. Then MN generates a
contract C as follows:
C = [CID ,w0 ,RS ,AQS ,PS ]
where CID = [TID ,S ,H ] is the contract identifier and w0
is the root of the hash chain.
Then MN and S inform H about the contract:
MN → S : C ,MACkMS (C ),MACkHM (C ) (7)
S → H : C ,MACkHM (C ),MACkHS (C ) (8)
(7) MN sends the contract C to S, together with two
MACs computed on C using the symmetric keys kMS and
kHM , respectively.
(8) S verifies C and MACkMS (C ) and if they are correct,
it computes a MAC on C using the symmetric key kHS it
shares with H. Then, S sends to H the contract C and the
MACs computed with kHM and kHS . H verifies the MACs
and, if they are correct, it stores the contract C.
MN and S also inform TCA about the contract:
MN → S : EPKTCA(C , kMT , pad),
MACkMS (EPKTCA(C , kMT , pad)) (9)
S → TCA : C ,EPKTCA(C , kMT , pad) (10)
TCA→ S : SpkTCA(C ),MACkMT (C ) (11)
S → MN : MACkMT (C ) (12)
(9) MN generates a fresh symmetric key kMT that MN
will use later to encrypt data for TCA (see Subsection 3.2.6).
In order to prevent the key retrieval by an attacker, MN
uses the probabilistic encryption by appending to the key
a pseudorandomly generated bitstring pad (the length on
the bitstring depends on the encryption algorithm used).
Then, MN encrypts C, kMS and pad using the public key
of TCA, computes a MAC on this data using the key kMS it
shares with S and sends the encrypted data and the MAC
to S.
(10) S verifies the MAC, removes it and sends C and the
encrypted data to TCA.
(11) TCA decrypts the data and compares the contract C
received in the encrypted data with the contract received in
clear from S. If they are identical, TCA signs the contract
C using its private key pkTCA, computes a MAC on it
using the symmetric key kMT that is shares with MN, and
sends the signature and the MAC back to S. TCA also
maintains C and kMT in its local database.
(12) S verifies the signature and if correct, it forwards
the MAC to MN which verifies it and stores kMT .
3.2.4 Service provision and payment
The session is subdivided into parts, depending on the
duration or on the amount of data exchanged between MN
and S. During the i-th part:
MN → S : TID ,wi ,MACkMS (TID ,wi) (13)
S → MN : i-th part of the service,
MACkMS (i-th part of the service) (14)
(13) MN sends to S its temporary identity TID, the i-th
PayWord wi and a MAC computed on both items using
the key kMS .
(14) S verifies the validity of wi by checking that h(wi) =
wi−1, where h is the one-way hash function used by MN
to generate the chain. If it is correct, S provides MN with
the i-th part of the service.
3.2.5 Sending the payment request
At the end of the session, S sends to H a payment re-
quest PR that contains, encrypted using kHS , the contract
identifier CID, the last hash value w` it received from MN
and the number ` of provided service parts. PR also con-
tains, in clear, the identity of S so that H is able to retrieve
the symmetric key kHS .
S → H : PR = [S ,CID ,w`, `,
MACkHS (S ,CID ,w`, `)] (15)
Upon receipt of PR, H verifies the validity of w` as ex-
plained in Subsection 3.1.1, retrieves the price PS from
the contract, rewards S for the ` parts of the service, and
charges MN. H is also remunerated (see details in Subsec-
tion 3.3).
3.2.6 Sending the satisfaction level
At the end of the session, MN generates a satisfaction
level message Sl as follows:
Sl = [EkMT (CID ,QoSEvalS,CID ,w`, `)] (16)
QoSEvalS,CID is expressed by MN and compares to what
extend the QoS it obtained during the session is complaint
with the QoS announced by S in the offer. kMT is the key
MN shares with TCA.
Then, MN reports on its satisfaction level to TCA:
MN → S : TID ,Sl ,MACkMS (TID ,Sl) (17)
S → TCA : S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl ,,
SPKS (S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl) (18)
(17)MN sends to S its temporary identifier TID, Sl data
and a MAC computed on both items.
(18) S verifies the MAC. If it is correct, S generates a
message containing CID, w`, ` and Sl, signs it and sends
the message and the signature to TCA.
TCA verifies the signature and retrieves the key it shares
with MN (using CID). Then TCA decrypts Sl, compares
the CID, w`, ` in the encrypted data to those received
in clear from S and if they are identical, TCA considers
QoSEval as a valid feedback. Then TCA informs H that
it correctly received the feedback:
TCA→ H : Ack ,S ,CID ,SPKTCA(Ack ,S ,CID) (19)
(19) H verifies the signature and retrieves the identity
of MN (using CID). Then, H remunerates MN a small
amount of money ε, which is meant to encourage the mobile
nodes sending the reports.
3.2.7 Updating the reputation record
TCA collects the information about the satisfaction lev-
els for a given period and then, at the reputation update
time, TCA updates the reputation record of each WISP,
signs them and informs the WISPs about their new records.
The new reputation record depends on the old one and on
the collected information. An example is given in Subsec-
tion 5.
TCA considers the absence of feedback as negative feed-
back. Indeed, TCA knows that a session has been estab-
lished between MN and S and that H is the home WISP
of MN (see Subsection 3.2.3). TCA is thus waiting for the
report from MN about its interaction with S, and not re-
ceiving it within a “reasonable” time is considered as bad
feedback.
3.3 Charging and rewarding model
In the previous Subsection (3.2), we presented the de-
tails of the solution. Some of these details are related to
the charging and rewarding mechanism and we summarize
them in this Subsection:
• During session setup, MN generates a chain of pay-
words w0, w1 , ..., wn.
• During the secure session with S, MN sends (wi, i) to
S as a payment proof for the i-th part of the service.
S can check the validity of the payment by verifying
that wi−1 = h(wi).
• H remuneratesMN a small amount ε when it receives
from TCA the confirmation that MN reported on its
interaction with S.
If, at the end of the session, MN moves away from
S (and therefore cannot send the feedback via S), it
is still possible for MN to report on its satisfaction
level to TCA via another WISP W : W includes its
identity in message (18) and signs the message using
its own private key. TCA then verifies the signature
and informs H in message (19) about the identity of
W . Then H gives both MN and W a reward (e.g.,
ε/2 for each).
• At the end of the session, S sends to H the last pay-
ment proof (w`, `) it received fromMN. H verifies the
validity of the payword w`, charges MN the amount
PS ∗ ` corresponding to the ` parts of the service and
rewards S, using a well-established e-payment tech-
nique, the amount5 PS ∗ ` − ε. If TCA receives no
report from MN, ε is handled according to some pol-
icy (e.g. it can be distributed to charity).
• The home network H is also remunerated. This can
be done e.g., if MN pays a flat monthly subscription
A or if MN pays an amount a per session. For sake
of simplicity, we consider the second approach in this
paper.
5As already mentioned, ε is the reward MN receives if it
reports on its satisfaction level to TCA.
4. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
4.1 Attacks
In this Subsection, we identify the attacks that an at-
tacker6 A may perform against our protocols (see Subsec-
tion 2.2 for the trust and adversarial model). We identify
the following attacks that are specific to our solution:
• Publicity attack: In Message 2, S advertises a QoS
that is higher than the real QoS it can offer.
• Selective publicity attack: S performs the Publicity
attack with a specific MN.
• Denigration attack: MN receives a good QoS from
S but pretends the contrary by sending a negative
report or no report at all.
• Flattering attack: MN sends systematically a good
feedback about S’s behavior to TCA. This attack
makes sense particularly if S = H.
• Report dropping attack: MN sends the report but S
does not transmit it to TCA.
• Service interruption attack: S receives the i-th pay-
ment proof from MN but does not provide the corre-
sponding part of the service.
• Refusal to pay attack: MN does not send the i-th
payment to S.
• Repudiation attack: S or MN retracts the agreement
it has with other party (e.g., S asks for higher price
than agreed on when the contract C was established).
We also consider general attacks such as:
• Packet dropping attack: A drops a message it is asked
to forward or discards a message it is asked to gener-
ate and send.
• Filtering attack: A modifies a packet it is asked to
forward or generate.
• Replay attack: A replays a valid message that was
exchanged between two legitimate parties.
We do not consider the case where aMN is compromised
but not duplicated (e.g., the mobile device in stolen): Well-
established mechanisms (e.g., blocking the node’s account)
can be used in this case.
4.2 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we will analyze the robustness of our
protocols against these attacks.
Publicity attack: If S does not provide MN with the
promised QoS, MN will send a negative report to TCA.
If this attack is repeated, the cumulation of the negative
reports will affect the future reputation records of S. If
on the contrary, this attack is performed rarely, it will not
affect much the reputation of S but S gains almost nothing
from performing this attack; as S is rational, it will not
perform this attack.
6As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, A can be a mobile node
or a WISP.
The same reasoning holds if S=H with, in addition, the
possibility for MN to punish H by choosing another home
WISP.
Selective publicity attack: The anonymity of the mo-
bile nodes prevents S (if S 6= H) from performing the Pub-
licity attack against a specific MN. The only possible selec-
tion would be based on the home network (i.e., S performs
the Publicity attack with all theMN s affiliated with a given
home network). S gains nothing from this attack and thus
S will not perform it.
Denigration attack: If MN does not send the report
on the satisfaction level, H will not give it the ε reward
and TCA will consider the absence of feedback as negative
feedback. Therefore, this attack is not rational for MN.
So it is more interesting for MN to send a negative feed-
back instead of not sending the report at all: The effect of
the attack is the same and at leastMN will get paid for the
sending. But this attack is still not rational. Indeed, MN
gains nothing from sending a negative feedback instead of
a positive one (the cost of the sending remains the same).
Such behavior is thus purely malicious.
This attack is not harmful for the WISP, unless it is per-
formed systematically and by a high number of colluding
attackers. However, TCA can statistically detect it if the
following events happen frequently7:
• The MN s affiliated with H always pretend that they
received a bad QoS from a given WISP (from a given
hot spot managed by that WISP), whereas many other
MNs report on a good QoS on that very WISP8. As
the selective publicity attack is not possible, this sit-
uation is suspect and TCA may punish9 H.
• TCA never receives reports from MN s affiliated with
H about the sessions they established with S.
• The MN s affiliated with H pretend that the QoS was
bad but at the same time the duration of the session
and the amount of data exchanged prove that the QoS
was good10.
Note that this attack comes with an important cost: if
an attacker A wants to alter the reputation of S by parking
misbehaving nodes close to the hot spots managed by S, A
should own many devices and devote them to the attack.
Note also that this colluding attack may harm very small
WISPs (with few number of hot spots) - if the attacker
pays the price - but it is much too costly against WISPs
with hundreds or thousands hot spots.
Flattering attack: It is not rational for MN to send a
positive feedback if it receives a bad QoS from S, unless it
has an incentive to do so (e.g., S remunerates MN for the
reports).
This attack improves the reputation of the targetedWISP
only if it is performed systematically and by a high num-
7The higher the number of events is, the more accurate
the detection is. Note that statistical detection techniques
do not hold if the majority of the nodes are misbehaving,
which is not likely to be the case in WiFi networks.
8In order to have more accurate detection, TCA can con-
sider each access point of the WISP separately.
9TCA, which is a honest and impartial party, can punish
H by downgrading it’s reputation record.
10TCA knows the root w0 of the hash chain from the con-
tract and knows well from the report; it can therefore es-
timate the mount of data exchanged between MN and S.
ber of colluding attackers. The detection mechanism can
be similar to the one proposed for the Denigration attack.
However, a specificity of this attack resides in the fact
that H can create “virtual” MN s (i.e., MN s that have
an account but are not necessarily real devices), emulate
connections with them and make them systematically send
positive feedback. This leads to a cost that is much lower
than the cost of the Denigration attack but TCA can de-
tect it if (i) the MN s affiliated with H rarely connect to
foreign WISPs (or at least much less than average) or if (ii)
H is not rewarded for the connections it established with
a high number of MN s affiliated with it (if we assume that
this information is available to TCA).
Report dropping attack: If S expects a negative feed-
back, it may want to drop the report on the satisfaction
level instead of transmitting it to TCA. But as the absence
of feedback counts as negative feedback, this dropping does
not help S. Furthermore, the report may be positive: As-
suming that the feedback is defined between values min-
Rep and maxRep, not receiving the report corresponds to a
feedback of minRep. This attack is therefore not rational.
Service interruption attack: If S refuses to provide
the i-th part of the service, MN will keep asking for it (by
sending again the i-th payment). After a predefined num-
ber of retransmission requests, MN will end the session,
which prevents S from providing more service parts (and
thus earning more money) and also affects the satisfaction
level of MN.
If nevertheless, we want to prevent S from receiving the
i-th payment without providing the i-th part of the service,
we can use the payment system presented in [4].
Refusal to pay attack: If MN does not send the i-th
payment, S will not provide the i-th part of the service
and the session will end (after a predefined number of re-
transmission requests). This attack is then not rational: It
prevents MN from receiving the service part but does not
harm S.
Repudiation attack: This attack is not possible be-
cause H and TCA receive the contract C from both MN
and S (Messages 8 and 10). The two copies should be
identical, otherwise TCA will not send the message 11 and
the session setup will not terminate. Therefore, once the
session is established,MN and S cannot retract their agree-
ment.
To prevent S or MN from sending a correct information
to TCA but not to H, we can also require a response from
H to establish the session.
Packet dropping attack: If a message is not generated
or is dropped during session setup, the secure session will
not be established. If A= MN (i.e., MN does not generate
messages 1, 3, 7 or 9), it will not be able to connect to the
Internet but does not harm S. If A= S , it will not provide
the part of the service toMN ;MN will select another WISP
and S would lose an opportunity for revenue.
If during the secure session, the payment proof or the
part of the service is not generated or is dropped, the en-
tity that is waiting for it asks for retransmissions (if needed
several times). If it does not receive the message, the ses-
sion is closed.
If S does not forward the satisfaction level of MN, it is
equivalent to the denigration attack (see Subsection 4.2).
If S does not generate the payment request and sends it
to H (Message 15), it will not get rewarded for the service
parts it provided to MN.
Filtering attack: The messages exchanged between
the different parties in our protocols are cryptographically
protected, using MAC computations or digital signatures.
Therefore, any modification of a message will be detected
at the receiver. Therefore, tampering with a message is
equivalent to not sending the message at all (an incorrect
message is discarded) and it is treated in the same way (see
the Packet dropping attack).
Replay attack: During session setup, the messages ex-
changed between the different entities (Messages (2) to (6))
are protected using nonces; the delayed messages are de-
tected and discarded.
During the secure session: the payment proofs and the
parts of the service arrive in sequence; a replay is immedi-
ately detected and discarded.
During session closing, the payment request and the sat-
isfaction level (Messages (15, (17) and (18)) are expected
only once; a replay is immediately detected and discarded.
4.3 Overhead
In this subsection, we evaluate the computation and com-
munication overhead of our solution for a mobile node. We
consider only the mobile node because it is the only entity
that is severely ressource restrained and because in this way
we cover all the wireless communications.
4.3.1 Computation overhead
During the different phases of our protocols, we use sym-
metric key and public key cryptography primitives to secure
the message exchange and to correctly authenticate the dif-
ferent parties involved in the communication. We minimize
however the use of public key cryptography, especially by
the mobile nodes, to reduce the computation cost.
Hence, MN uses public key primitives only for two mes-
sages: it verifies the certificate, the signature and the repu-
tation of the WISP it selects (Message 2) and it encrypts a
message for TCA (Message 9). For all other messages, MN
uses symmetric key cryptography primitives: 5 + 2` MAC
operations (` being the total number of service parts), 2
encryptions and 1 decryption.
Public key operations are also used in the message ex-
change between TCA and the two WISPs S and H (Mes-
sages 11, 18 and 19). It is however possible to commute
them into symmetric key operations, if we assume that S
and TCA establish a symmetric key when they first begin
their interaction.
Note that the existence of a tamperproof hardware atMN
is not necessary for the good functioning of our protocols,
but it may be a good solution for protecting the long term
symmetric key kHM that MN shares with H.
4.3.2 Communication overhead
Table 1 provides reasonable values of the size of the dif-
ferent fields appearing in our protocol.
Field Name ReqID IDs nM ,pad wi `
Size (bytes) 4 16 20 20 2
Field Name MAC PK QoS, P, R k tag
Size (bytes) 16 150 1 16 6
Table 1: Size of the fields used in our protocol
ReqID is encoded on 4 bytes to reduce the risk of using
the same identifier for two different requests. The identi-
fiers of the WISPs and the nodes (W , H, S, MN and TID)
are encoded on 16 bytes (assuming e.g. an IPv6 format).
The paywords wi are encoded on 20 bytes (assuming e.g.
SHA) and the QoS (AQ and QoSEval), the reputation R
and the price P are encoded on 1 byte each (which is enough
to encode values between 0 and 100). The symmetric keys
kHM , kHS , kMS and kMT are encoded on 16 bytes (128 bits)
and the public keys are encoded on 150 bytes (assuming
e.g. RSA, see [13]). We encode the nonce nM and the
pad on 20 bytes, the tag on 6 bytes (see Subsection 3.1.2)
and MAC on 16 bytes. Finally, we encode ` on 2 bytes to
support long sessions.
We consider the example where MN is downloading a
1 MB file. The file is divided into 1 KB packets and each 50
packets represent a part of service (` = 20 parts of service in
total). Using the values of Table 1, an end-to-end session
between MN and S represents an overhead, for MN, of
18337 bytes, which represents an overhead per packet of
around 18 bytes (i.e., less than 2% of the packet size).
5. REPUTATION SYSTEM ASSESSMENT
Our solution motivates the different players to partici-
pate in the reputation mechanisms. Indeed:
• W is motivated to provideMN with the QoS it promised
because otherwise the feedback of MN will be nega-
tive (see the analysis of the Publicity attack in Sub-
section 4.2).
• MN is motivated to report on its interaction with W
because it receives a refund ε.
• W is motivated to forward the report (see the analysis
of the Report dropping attack in Subsection 4.2).
However, we want also to study the effect of the repu-
tation mechanism on the behavior of the WISPs, i.e., the
QoS they effectively offer to the mobile users. We therefore
implemented our set of protocols using ns-2 simulator [10].
Using these simulations, we want to verify that:
• The WISPs are encouraged to provide the MNs with
a good QoS;
• The WISPs are discouraged from advertising a QoS
that is different from the QoS they can really offer;
• It is possible for a WISP that has a bad reputation
record to improve its reputation.
5.1 Simulations setup
5.1.1 Decision making at MN
During the WISP selection phase, MN receives several
offers from the WISPs. For each offer OfferW , MN com-
putes a value DecisionW = Rep
α
W ·AQβW · P−γW . It then de-
termines
DecisionS = max
W
{DecisionW }
and selects the WISP S.
• RepW is the reputation of the WISP W : It is a value
between minRep=0 and maxRep=100.
• AQW is the QoS advertised by W : For the sake of
simplicity, we also assume that it is a value between
minQoS=0 and maxQoS=100.
• PW is the price W is demanding for each part of the
service.
• The exponents α, β and γ are parameters that de-
pend on the application MN is running;they are used
to emphasize the importance of the variables (RepW ,
AQW or PW ). We consider as an example the two
following applications:
– Chat: The user is most likely to choose theWISP
that asks for the lowest price. Therefore, we set
α, β and γ to 2, 1 and 3, respectively.
– File transfer: The user is most likely to choose
the WISP that offers the highest QoS. Therefore,
we set α, β and γ to 2, 2 and 1, respectively.
Note that:
• In order to minimize his personal involvement, the
user should set the parameters α, β and γ, for each
family of applications, once and for all. However, he
should have the possibility to modify them if needed.
• The traffic model (i.e., the frequency at which the
packets are sent from S to MN ) is the same for the
three applications. The only difference is in the choice
of the parameters α, β and γ.
• If two (or more) WISPs have the same DW , one of
them is selected at random.
More sophisticated utility functions can include criteria
such as the minimum QoS MN is expecting or the max-
imum price it is willing to pay.
5.1.2 Service provision and QoS
The real QoS RQS , 0 ≤ RQS ≤ 100 received by MN can
be different from AQS (the QoS advertised by S during
session setup). During the implementation of our set of
protocols, we represented the behavior of S whose real QoS
is RQS as follows
11: Each time S has to provide a “part of
service”12 to MN, it sends it with a probability RQS/100 .
IfMN does not receive the packet, it sends a retransmission
request to S. After 4 unsuccessful retransmission requests,
MN closes the session with S. The time during which MN
is waiting for the packets and asking for retransmissions
represents a delay that justifies the decrease of the QoS
offered by S.
5.1.3 Satisfaction level report
At the end of each session, MN evaluates the real QoS it
received from S. There can be different levels of satisfac-
tion for this evaluation. We provide here a simple example
based on packet counting:
RQS = max (0 ,
nbPkts − nbRetReq
nbPkts
·maxQoS)
where nbPkts is the total number of packets it received13
from S and nbRetReq is the number of retransmissions it
had to request.
11As mentioned in Subsection 5.1.1, we assume that min-
QoS=0 and maxQoS=100.
12For the sake of simplicity of explanation, we consider in
our implementation that the provider sends one part of
service per packet.
13In the special case where nbPkts = 0 (i.e., MN receives
no packet from S), we have RQS = 0.
Then, MN compares RQS to AQS by computing:
QoSEvalS,CID =
RQS
AQS
5.1.4 Reputation records update
TCA updates the reputation records every 2000 seconds.
The new reputation newRepS of S is computed as follows:
newRepS = λ · RepS + (1 − λ) ·
∑
CID QoSEvalS,CID
nbSessionsS
where RepS is the current reputation of S, nbSessionsS
is the number of sessions established by S (and already
closed) during the last 2000 seconds and feedbackS is the
sum of all QoSEvalS received over all these sessions (the
absence of feedback is considered as QoSEvalS = 0 ). λ
represents the “weight of the past” and is set to 1/2 in
our simulations.
Note that if S advertises a QoS that is lower than the real
QoS it offers (i.e., AQS < RQS ), we will have QoSEvalS >
maxRep, which may lead to a new reputation that is also
higher than maxRep. If it is the case, TCA keeps newRepS
as it is in its database but sends to S a new reputation
record equal to maxRep.
5.1.5 Simulation environment
We consider a network of 5 WISPs and 50 MNs. The
WISPs are numbered from 1 to 5 and for each WISP, we
define the advertised QoS, the real QoS and the price it
asks for each part of the service. We initialize the repu-
tation of the WISPs to maxRep = 100 . MN s and WISPs
are static14 and each WISP is a home WISP for 10 MNs.
Each simulation lasts for 50000 seconds and the reputation
updates are made every 2000 seconds.
We consider that a WISP W is:
• “honest” if it advertises the real QoS it is offering
(i.e., RQW = AQW ),
• “misbehaving” if it advertises a QoS that is higher
that the real QoS it is offering (i.e., RQW < AQW ),
• “modest” if it advertises a QoS that is lower than the
real QoS it is offering (i.e., RQW > AQW ).
We conducted three sets of simulations to study three
aspects of our solution:
Set 1: We want to study the reaction of the network if
all the WISPs are honest but offer different QoSs: WISPs
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 advertise and offer QoS = 60, 70, 80, 90 and
99, respectively15. We consider the two following scenarios:
Scenario 1.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price. At
the beginning of a simulation, we assign to each MN,
with equal probability, one of the two following ap-
plications: chat or file transfer (see Subsection 5.1.1).
Scenario 1.2: The WISPs ask for prices that are propor-
tional to their QoSs (PW ∼ RQW ). We expect the
choice of the application to have an effect on the re-
sults, so we run 2 sets of simulations; one for each
kind of application (i.e., all the nodes run that appli-
cation).
14All MN s are within the power range of all WISPs, it is
therefore useless to consider mobility in this case.
15We do not consider the case where AQ = 100 because such
a perfect case is probably not possible in real life conditions.
Set 2: We want to study the reaction of the network
to the presence of misbehaving WISPs and modest WISPs:
WISPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 advertise AQ = 60, 70, 80, 90
and 99, respectively; but all of them offer RQ = 80. We
consider the two following scenarios:
Scenario 2.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price. At
the beginning of a simulation, we assign to each MN,
with equal probability, one of the following applica-
tions: chat or file transfer.
Scenario 2.2: The WISPs ask for prices that are propor-
tional to their QoSs (PW ∼ RQW ). We expect the
choice of the application to have an effect on the re-
sults, so we run 2 sets of simulations; one for each
kind of application (i.e., all the nodes run that appli-
cation).
Set 3: We assume that all the WISPs are honest, offer
the same QoS and ask for the same price. At the begin-
ning of a simulation, we assign to each MN, with equal
probability, one of the following applications: chat or file
transfer. We want to study the effect of the initial reputa-
tion of a WISP that opens its service. We assume that the
newcomer is WISP 1 and we consider the three following
scenarios:
Scenario 3.1: The initial reputation of WISP 1 equals the
one of the other WISPs (Rep1 = maxRep = 100 be-
cause the WISPs are honest).
Scenario 3.2: The initial reputation of WISP 1 is lower
than the one of the other WISPs (Rep1 = 50 ).
Scenario 3.3: The initial reputation of WISP 1 is lower
than the one of the other WISPs (Rep1 = 50 ) but
WISP 1 asks for a lower price.
5.2 Simulation Results
We run 10 simulations for each of the scenarios listed in
Subsection 5.1.5 (i.e., the plots represent the average over
the 10 measurements). Each WISP W is characterized by
the triplet (AQW ,RQW ,PW ) (See the legend in Figures 3
to 11). The results are the following:
Set 1: The results for Scenario 1.1 show that if all the
WISPs ask for the same price, almost all the users select the
WISP that offers the best QoS (WISP 5 in Figure 3). The
other WISPs (mainly WISP 4) can occasionally have some
clients because the randomness introduced for the service
provision at the WISPs (see Subsection 5.1.2) may lead to
a slight decrease in WISP 5’s reputation.
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Figure 3: Results for Scenario 1.1.
The results for Scenario 1.2 show that if all the WISPs
offer different QoSs and ask for different prices, the choice
of the users depends on the application they are running;
e.g., if the nodes run a chat application (see Figure 4),
the majority of the nodes choose the WISP 2 whereas if
the nodes run a file transfer application (see Figure 5), the
majority of the nodes choose the WISP 5 that offers the
best QoS.
Note that in Scenario 1.2, nodes running the chat appli-
cation do not choose WISP 1 even if it offers a lower price
than WISP 2. By analyzing the data, we realized that this
is because the reputation of WISP 2 is significantly higher
than the one of WISP 1, which is caused by the random-
ness introduced, for the service provision, at the WISPs
(see Subsection 5.1.2).
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Figure 4: Results for Scenario 1.2 (chat).
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Figure 5: Results for Scenario 1.2 (file transfer).
These results clearly prove that:
• the WISPs are encouraged to provide a good QoS and
• honest WISPs offering different QoSs can co-exist in
the same network.
Set 2: The results for Scenario 2.1 show that if all the
WISPs ask for the same price, most of the users select the
WISP that offers the best real QoS (WISP 3 in Figure 6).
Modest WISPs (here WISPs 1 and 2) and misbehaving
WISPs (here WISPs 4 and 5) are selected much less often.
Note that the mobile nodes have no direct indication
on the real QoS of the WISPs. They are however able
to correctly evaluate the behavior of the WISPs because
the correspondence between the advertised QoS and the
real QoS is taken into consideration in the updating of the
reputations.
The results for Scenario 2.2 show that almost all the
nodes that run the chat application (see Figure 7) choose
WISP 1, which offers the lowest price and at the same time
has a very good reputation. The majority of the nodes
running a file transfer application (see Figure 8) choose
WISP 3 because it offers the best real QoS.
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Figure 6: Results for Scenario 2.1.
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Figure 7: Results for Scenario 2.2 (chat).
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Figure 8: Results for Scenario 2.2 (file transfer).
These results clearly prove that the WISPs are discour-
aged from misbehaving (i.e., to advertise a QoS that is
higher than the real QoS they can offer) and from being
modest (i.e., advertising a QoS that is lower than the real
QoS they can offer).
Set 3: In Scenarios 3.1 and 3.2, all the WISPs offer the
same QoS and ask for the same price.
The results for Scenario 3.1 show that if WISP 1 has,
when it opens its service, the same reputation as the other
WISPs, it has more or less the same probability to get
clients as others do (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Results for Scenario 3.1.
The results for Scenario 3.2 show if WISP 1 has, when it
opens its service, a reputation that is lower than the repu-
tation of all other WISPs, it has no chance to get clients.
(see Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Results for Scenario 3.2.
In Scenario 3.3, all the WISPs offer the same QoS and all
of them, except WISP 1, ask for the same price; WISP 1
asks for a much lower price (3 times less than for the oth-
ers). The results show that by decreasing the price it is
asking for, WISP 1 can “reintegrate” the network and get
the clients.
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Figure 11: Results for Scenario 3.3.
Note that even if according to the results WISP 1 gets
almost all the clients, it is not interesting for it to keep
the price very low because it will probably not cover its
expenses; lowering the prices can therefore be considered a
way of “launching” (if the initial reputation is not maxRep)
or of “redemption” (if the WISP damaged its own reputa-
tion because it misbehaved).
These results clearly prove that:
• the initial reputation of the WISPs should be set to
maxRep, not to oblige them to lower their prices16.
If afterwards they do not offer a good QoS or if they
misbehave, they will be punished as we showed in the
previous scenarios.
• if the reputation of a given WISP decreases because
it misbehaves, this WISP is still able to reintegrate
the network. However this reintegration comes with
a cost (i.e., asking for a price that is much lower than
usual).
5.3 Prediction of the QoS offered by the WISP
In Subsection 2.1, we assume that S is able to evaluate
the QoS it provides to the mobile nodes; in the simplest
16A WISP trying to cheat by changing its identity would
be detected by the TCA (because it has to register with it
each time).
implementation, this QoS would be limited to the mean
bitrate; more sophisticated solutions would consider ad-
ditional parameters such as the provided peak rate, the
maximum delay, and the maximum delay jitter; this would
be notably the case with IEEE 802.11e [12]. Indeed, the
proper operation of our protocols requires S to be able to
predict the QoS that it will be able to offer (see the results
for the second set of simulations in Subsection 5.2).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no well-established
QoS “prediction” technique in CSMA/CA network. We
propose the following, statistics-based solution: while it
operates, S maintains:
• the history of its connections with the mobile nodes,
• the QoS it was able to offer to them, and
• the conditions under which this QoS provision was
possible, such as (i) the number ofMN s served simul-
taneously per hot spot; (ii) the number of neighboring
access points (i.e., taking interference into account);
(iii) the period of the day (e.g., peak hours, etc.); (iv)
the period of the year (e.g., working day, week-end,
holidays, etc.).
Using this information, S predicts the QoS it can offer. It
can then for example decide to what extent it wants to
“overbook” itself. This QoS prediction can be combined to
the use of a Differentiated Bandwidth Allocation similar to
the one proposed in the CHOICE architecture [1, 15].
6. STATE OF THE ART
Reputation-based systems: These systems are mainly
used to build trust and foster cooperation among a given
community. The efficiency of reputation mechanisms have
been widely studied in various fields and with different ap-
proaches. Studies such as [8, 18, 19] consider the effect of
online reputation systems [5] on e-marketing and trading
communities like e-Bay. Reputation mechanisms are also
used to foster cooperation in peer-to-peer networks [6] or
in ad hoc networks [3, 14].
But, from all these studies, we cannot draw a clear con-
clusion about the efficiency of reputation systems; each of
these mechanisms should thus be analyzed on a per-case
basis.
Roaming in WISPs: The deployment and success of
WiFi networks is slowed down by the lack of interoper-
ability between WiFi providers (also called fragmentation
problem [16]): A client that has an account with a WISP A
cannot connect to a hotspot managed by a WISP B. How-
ever, the situation is changing and more and more WISPs
are establishing roaming agreements (similar to what is
done for cellular networks). The roaming can be between
providers within the same country (e.g., T-Mobile and iPass
in the US) or international (e.g., between the British BT
and the American Airpath).
Another solution would be to use the service of a WiFi
roaming operator such as Boingo Wireless [9]. Such an op-
erator tries to solve the roaming problem by having agree-
ments with as many WISPs as possible. Then it aggregates
all the hot spots managed by these WISPs into a single
(seamless) network. However, Boingo does not consider
the problem of the variable QoS in WiFi networks.
In [17], Patel and Crowcroft propose a ticket based sys-
tem that allows mobile users to connect to foreign service
providers: The user contacts a ticket server to acquire a
ticket, requests a service from a service server and uses the
ticket to pay for that service. However, unlike the solution
we present in this paper, the authors do not question the
honesty of the service providers i.e., they assume that the
service providers provide the users with a good quality of
service, which is far from being guaranteed in WiFi net-
works. The same problem exists in the solution proposed
by Zhang et al. [22].
In [7], Efstathiou and Polyzos present a Peer-to-Peer
Wireless Network Confederation (P2PWNC) where the roam-
ing problem is considered as a peer-to-peer resource sharing
problem. Indeed, they propose a solution where a WISP
has to allow the foreign users to access its hotspots in or-
der to allow its own users to connect to foreign WISPs’
hotspots. However, this solution presents the same prob-
lem as for [17], i.e., there is no guarantee of a good QoS
provision.
In [2], we considered also the problem of interoperability
between the WISPs and we used a reputation system to
foster good QoS provision. However, the solution proposed
in [2] differs from the one presented in this paper in two
main points. The first difference is the trust model: In
[2], we consider that even if H is itself a WISP, it plays
only the role of a home network and is trusted by all other
parties. On the contrary, S is considered as rational (i.e., it
can cheat if it is beneficial). We think that this assumption
should be relaxed because H can be a home WISP for some
nodes but, at the same time, a foreign WISP for other
nodes; assuming that it will be rational and honest at the
same time makes no sense. The second difference is in the
content of the paper: Compared to [2], here we present the
details of the protocols, we offer a detailed security analysis
of the solution and we evaluate the reputation system.
7. CONCLUSION
The work presented in this paper describes a simple so-
lution that enables a mobile node to connect to a foreign
WISP in a secure way while preserving its anonymity and
meanwhile discouraging the WISPs from intentionally pro-
viding the mobile users with a bad QoS.
We have analyzed the robustness of our solution against
different attacks and we have shown that our protocols
thwart rational attacks, detect malicious attacks and iden-
tify the attacker.
We have proved by means of simulations that the WISPs
are encouraged to provide the MNs with a good QoS and,
at the same time, discouraged from advertising a QoS that
is different from the QoS they can really offer.
In terms of future work, we plan to study more in de-
tail the prediction of the QoS the WISPs can offer to their
clients and the cheating detection techniques. We also plan
to investigate the feasibility of a “multi-hop WiFi network”
(i.e., a WiFi network that is extended using multi-hop com-
munications [21]) in terms of network performance and se-
curity.
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